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The property rights theory of the …rm of Grossman-Hart-Moore (henceforth GHM)
identi…es asset ownership with the residual control rights over the use of physical assets
(Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). The theory shows in a
two-agent model that when complete contracting is not possible, an agent should own
an asset (i.e., have the control rights over the ex post decisions that are uncontractible
ex ante) if her incentive to make relationship-speci…c investment is more important
than that by the other agent. GHM therefore do not distinguish between ownership
and control. But ownership of an asset is often regarded to entail the claim on the
returns (or, more precisely, residual income) from the asset. It is in this sense the term
“ownership” is used in the literature on the separation of ownership and control. In
Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) classical paper, the rights to be the residual claimant
are the …rst among a bundle of rights that de…ne the ownership of the classical …rm.
Hart (1995, pp.63-66) o¤ersafewinformal but insightful remarks on therelationship
between residual income and control. First, he notes that residual income may be
di¢cult tomeasure and sometimesmay not even be well-de…ned; and if it is measurable,
it is not always bundled together with residual control. He then proceeds to give a few
justi…cations for why residual income and residual control are often bundled together.
In particular, Hart comments that residual income and residual control may not be
separable and the party having residual control may be able to divert some of the
income away for her own private bene…t.
The paper modi…es the GHM model based on the above insights from Hart to
achieve several related objectives. The …rst and the most important objective is to
endogenize the allocation of both the income rights and the control rights and hence
to show why the two are often bundled together in the context of a two-party joint
venture. Speci…cally, we consider a two-period, double-sided moral hazard model in
which two parties each make an unobservable investment (e¤ort) to a joint project in
the …rst period (ex ante); and an ex ante uncontractible action (an operating decision)
involving the project is then taken in the second period (ex post). The income from
the project is (stochastically) determined by the ex ante investments as well as the ex
post action, which meanwhile may generate a private bene…t to the party that has the
control rights over the action. Departing from GHM, we assume that the income from
the joint project is publicly observable, and hence an ex ante revenue-sharing contract
becomes possible. We make this assumption because only when income is more or less
veri…able can we study the relationship between income rights and control rights.
Our second objective is to demonstrate when GHM’s key results would still hold if
1a contractual allocation of income is possible. We will show that GHM’s results that
control rights matter in the organization of economic transactions and that control
rights should, at least normally, be allocated to the party whose investment incentive is
relatively more important are basically una¤ected by introducing the possibility of con-
tractual revenue sharing. But we show that it is not the control rights over assets per se
but rather the revenue-sharing contract that provides investment incentives; however,
the allocation of control rights makes the revenue-sharing contract renegotiation-proof
ex post.
Because ex post action is not contractible ex ante, it must be decided ex post. This
gives rise not only to the need for allocating control rights but also to the possibility
of renegotiating the ex ante revenue-sharing contract. This is because a party who has
either the exclusive control rights or the joint control rights over the ex post action may
use the rights as a bargaining chip to renegotiate the ex ante revenue-sharing contract.
An important departure of the paper from GHM is that we consider both cooperative
Nash bargaining and noncooperative alternating-o¤er bargaining and show how they
may a¤ect the optimal contractual arrangements. A number of recent papers (Chiu,
1998; De Meza and Lockwood, 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998) have shown that the
speci…c results of GHM depend on the solution concept they use for the ex post bar-
gaining game. If instead of using the Nash bargaining solution with the no-negotiation
outcome as the disagreement point, the use of the “outside options principle”, which
can be derived from a Rubinstein-style alternating-o¤er noncooperative bargaining
game (Binmore et al., 1989), may reverse the GHM results; i.e., in some situations, an
agent who makes important investment decisions should not have the control rights.
In addition to the above two bargaining solutions, we also consider another variant of
the Nash bargaining solution in which the disagreement point is determined by what
Nash (1953) calls rational threats (also see Myerson, 1991).
The third objective of the paper is to study how the use of di¤erent bargaining
solutions for the ex post contract renegotiation game may a¤ect the optimal allocation
of income and control rights. We show that only under Nash bargaining with the
non-negotiation outcome as the disagreement point can it be optimal for the minority
shareholder, who is also the party whose investment incentive is less important, to have
the control rights (i.e., revenue sharing and control rights are unbundled). Under both
Nash bargaining with rational threats as the disagreement point and noncooperative
alternating-o¤er bargaining, revenue sharing and control rights are always bundled
together; in other words, the minority shareholder should never have the control rights.
These results are in contrast with those of the aforementioned articles.
Finally, while ex ante investments are in relationship-speci…c human capital in
GHM, we assume that they are embodied in the physical assets of the joint project.
2In so doing, we are able to show that joint ownership can be optimal.1 Therefore, the
fourth objective of the paper is to use our results to explain the commonly observed
contractual arrangements of equity joint ventures. We are able to explain, …rst of all,
when and why the majority shareholding partner of a joint venture is normally the
controlling party. Second, our results provide an explanation for a somewhat puzzling
feature of joint ventures, i.e., many of them are owned 50:50 by the two companies
setting them up. The 50:50 joint ownership is puzzling because it appears to provide
sub-optimal incentives unless incentive provisions for both partners to make e¢cient
investments or work e¤orts are equally important. An even more puzzling ownership
arrangement of joint ventures is the 51:49 ownership structure in which one partner
owns 51% of the equity shares and is the controlling partner of the joint venture
(Dasgupta and Tao, 1998). We provide a scenario in which the 51:49 joint venture
is optimal.
The question of why income and control are often bundled together has been ad-
dressed in the “one share-one vote” literature (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and
Raviv, 1988; Hart, 1995). Theories along that line are based on the agency costs
associated with the private bene…ts of control and the market for corporate control.
This paper adopts the idea of private bene…ts of control but addresses the bundling
of income and control rights in the context of a joint venture between two business
partners. In such a setup, corporate takeovers become less relevant.
To the extent that our results can be used to explain the ownership structure of
equity joint ventures, this paper is related to the theoretical papers on joint owner-
ship, which are surprisingly very few. Dasgupta and Tao (1998) propose a theory of
equity joint ventures by distinguishing between marketable equities and unmarketable
revenue-sharing contracts. In a related paper, Dasgupta and Tao (1999) explain par-
tial ownership in an upstream …rm by a downstream …rm as a device to increase the
former’s incentive to choose relationship-speci…c investments over general investments.
But both papers treat ownership as shares of revenue and either ignore control rights or
simply assume that the majority shareholder has the control rights, which they inter-
pret as the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er in bilateral bargaining. Cai (1999)
develops a theory of joint asset ownership by extending the GHM model to situations
where the level of investment speci…city is endogenously determined. He shows that
when speci…c investments and general investments are substitutes, joint ownership is
optimal in most cases. Similar to GHM, he ignores the possibility of revenue-sharing
contracts. A more closely related paper is Bai et al. (1998). They also consider the
1Hart (1995, pp.68-9) illustrates with an example why investments in physical assets may lead to
joint ownership. But, in his example, revenue is not veri…able and the party that has the the control
rights can take away all the revenue.
3relationship between revenue sharing and control rights and show that under the Out-
side Option Principle, joint ownership makes the second-best revenue-sharing contract
self-enforcing. However, they assume that if a manager controls an asset, he can quit
the relationship and receive all the revenue while a manager who does not control any
asset receives nothing if he quits. In our model, each of the two managers is entitled to
the contractually speci…ed share of the public revenue, which cannot be taken away by
the controlling party. Moreover, in our model, joint ownership is optimal only under
certain conditions and does not implement the second-best outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section
3 provides a preliminary analysis of the model. Section 4 characterizes the optimal
sharing of revenueand allocation of control rightsunderNash bargainingwith twotypes
of disagreement points while Section 5 considers noncooperative bargaining. Section 6




We consider a two-period model involving two risk-neutral parties: M 1 and M 2.
In period 1 (ex ante), each party can make an unobservable investment (or e¤ort) to
develop a joint project: e1 for M 1 and e2 for M 2. Following Kim and Wang (1998),
we de…ne a composite investment (e¤ort), represented by h = h(e1;e2): Let c1(e1) and
c2(e2); which are also unobservable to other parties, denote the disutilities of M 1’s and
M 2’s investment (e¤ort), respectively.
Let R be the space of real numbers, R+ be the space of non-negative real numbers,
and E be the space of investment (e¤ort), which, for simplicity, is taken to be a subset
of R: We make the following technical assumptions.
Assumption 1. h(e1;e2) 2 R is strictly increasing in e1 and in e2:
Assumption 2. c1(e1) 2 R+ and c2(e2) 2 R+ are convex and strictly increasing in
e1 and in e2 respectively.
In period 2 (ex post), some further action involving the project, such as deciding on
a speci…c type of product to produce or hiring a suitable manager to run the project, a
2For the convenience of the referees, the proof of the noncooperative bargaing solution, which is
drawn from Binmore et al (1990), is attached in Appendix B.
42 A needs to be taken, where A denotes the space of feasible actions. This action itself
is assumed to be costless but a¤ects the revenue of the project and may potentially
generate private bene…ts to one of the two parties as well. The project yields at the end
of period 2 a random revenue X; the range of which belongs to R+ . The realization
of X is determined by the composite investment e¤ort h(e1;e2); the ex post action
a 2 A and the state of nature ! 2 -; where - denotes the space of the states of
nature, which is realized at the end of period 1 or at the beginning of period 2, i.e., after
the investments are made but before the action is taken. Formally, X ´ X(a;!;h):
Departing from GHM, we assume that the revenue of the project is publicly observable
and hence is contractible ex ante.
Following GHM, we suppose that ! represents a highly complex state of the world,
including, for example, the state of consumer preferences. It is thus prohibitively costly
to write a contract contingent on ! in su¢ciently precise terms to make it enforceable
by a third party. However, the realization of ! is assumed to be observable to both
parties.
The optimal action a that maximizes the total ex post revenue depends on the
realization of ! as well as the ex ante investments. We assume that the nature of the
optimal action is prohibitively di¢cult to foresee or describe ex ante at date 1. For ex-
ample, suppose the joint project is for the production of a technologically sophisticated
widget. Before the state of nature is realized about the preferences of potential buyers
for speci…c types of widgets, it is often impossible to know in advance the details of the
widget that should be produced. Again, we assume that the action can be speci…ed ex
post in a contract without di¢culty (this requires the action to be publicly observable
and hence contractible in period 2).3
Let a¤(!;h) denote the unique ex post e¢cient action. Thus, a¤ maximizes the ex
post revenue of the project. Let X¤(!;h) ´ X(a¤;!;h) denote the ex post maximum
revenue conditional on h and ! . Let the random variable X¤; which is assumed to
be strictly positive, be described by a distribution function F(x;h); and f(x;h) be






3For standard justi…cations of incomplete contracts, see Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1988). While we are aware of Maskin and Tirole (1999), who argue
that unveri…ability does not necessarily preclude the existence of an ex ante e¢cient information
elicitation mechanism (contract) that makes the unveri…able information de facto veri…able, we follow
GHM both for the simplicity of the assumption of incomplete contracting and for the fact that we
allow ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract, which weakens Maskin and Tirole’s result. For a
formal foundation of incomplete contracts, see Hart and Moore (1999) and Segal (1999).
5Assumption 3. R(e1;e2) is concave and strictly increasing separately in e1 and in
e2: 4
This assumption seems natural; Kim-Wang (1998) mention conditions under which



























As a is not contractible ex ante in period 1, it must be decided ex post in period
2.5 We suppose that ex post control rights over a can be contracted on in period
1. We consider three possible ways of allocating the control rights: M 1 control; M 2
control; and joint control (i.e., each party has the veto rights over a): In the case of
joint control, if the two parties cannot reach an agreement on a, then we suppose that
no revenue from the project will be realized: 6 If a single party has the control rights
over a, then in the absence of ex post bargaining, the controlling party can choose
whatever a she wants to.
An important component of the model is that we assume that the controlling party
can acquire a private bene…t of control from choosing a sub-optimal ex post action.
The non-controlling party is, however, assumed to enjoy no private bene…t from the
controlling party’s choice. Let Bi(a;!;h) denote the (nonnegative) private bene…t to
M i when the ex ante contract allocates M i with the control rights and a is chosen
at date 2. We assume, for simplicity, X(a;!;h) + Bi(a;!;h) < X¤ for a 6= a¤ and
B1(a¤;!;h) = B2(a¤;!;h) = 0: In other words, we assume that it is socially ine¢cient
for the controlling party to enjoy any private bene…t of control and that ex post e¢cient
action a¤ entails no private bene…t to the controlling party. Furthermore, we assume
4To the extent that the investments by both parties increase the total revenue, they can be thought
of as cooperative investments as in Che and Hausch (1999). With slight modi…cations, our model can
be interpreted as a procurement model with relationship-speci…c cooperative investments. A di¤erence
between our model and that of Che and Hausch is that we assume revenue is contractible but the ex
post action is not, while they assume the contrary.
5In the context of a simple procurement model studied by Hart and Moore (1988), several authors
(Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey, 1994; Chung, 1991; Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996; Hermalin and Katz,
1993; Nöldeke and Schmidt, 1995) show that e¢ciency can be achieved by appropriately-designed
simple contracts, although incomplete, without the aid of an ownership arrangement. These articles
rely on the assumption that ex post trade is ex ante contractible. But in a more complex setup that
goes beyond a simple procurement relationship, future actions may be di¢cult to contract on. This
paper shows that when the future action is indeed uncontractible, control rights allocation has a role
to play.
6While in equilibrium, a = a¤; the right to veto the e¢cient action gives each …rm a bargaining
instrument.
6that the private bene…t is only observable to the insiders (i.e., the two parties involved)
but not to the outsiders, implying that it is not contractible.
Examples of unveri…able private bene…ts of control abound. For instance, the con-
trolling party can use her decision power to sell the widget at an unnecessarily low
price to a …rm in which she or her relatives have a personal stake. This private bene…t,
however, can be di¢cult to verify if the widget is not a standard product and hence
has no market price to which it can be compared. This action is ine¢cient from the
perspective of maximizing the total revenue of the project because the private bene…t
the controlling party enjoys is only a fraction of the price concession she makes to the
third party. Alternatively, the controlling party can choose to produce a speci…c type
of widget that suits a related …rm’s need rather than a widget for an unrelated …rm at
a higher price.
The above setup is however too general for us to derive speci…c results. Therefore,
for the most part of this paper (except for Section 3), we make further simplifying
assumptions. We assume that the private bene…ts of control take the following linear
form:
Bi(a;!;h) = bi[X
¤(!;h) ¡X(a;!;h)]; for i = 1 or 2;
where bi 2 [0;1) is a constant. In other words, for every suboptimal action, the
controlling party can acquire a private bene…t that is a constant proportion of the lost
revenue.
Let q(a;!;h) ´ X(a;!;h)=X¤(!;h); which is 1 for a = a¤ and less than 1 for
a 6= a¤: The above de…nition can be expressed as
Bi(a;!;h) = bi[1 ¡ q(a;!;h)]X
¤; for i = 1 or 2:
Furthermore, we assume that for any e q 2 [0;1]; there exists an action a 2 A such
that q(a;!;h) = e q 2 [0;1] for all h 2 R and ! 2 -: In other words, the controlling
party can always …nd a choice of action that will enable her to acquire any amount of
private bene…ts of control between 0 and biX¤: This assumption requires the feasible
set of actions A to be su¢ciently rich.
With the above simplifying assumption, the controlling party M i can be thought
of as being able to act as if she can choose a q between 0 and 1 and acquire an
unveri…able private bene…t bi(1 ¡ q)X¤. This in turn can be interpreted in the sense
that the controlling party can “cream o¤” a fraction of the potential total revenue,
i.e. (1 ¡ q)X¤;at a cost of (1 ¡ bi)(1 ¡ q)X¤ to the joint project.7 We will refer to
7This interpretation of the private bene…t of control follows the way in which asset ownership
is interpreted in Hart (1988), which, in showing the role of asset ownership, considers a number of
scenarios in which the owner of an asset is assumed to be able either to siphon o¤ a fraction of the
7X(a;!;h) = q(a;!;h)X¤(!;h) as the public revenue. For most part of the paper, we
will speak of the choice of (or control rights over) q instead of the action a itself.
2.2. Ex Ante Contracting and Ex Post Contract Renegotiation
At the beginning of period 1, the two parties can sign an ex ante contract that
allocates the public revenue fromthe project as well as the control rights over an ex post
action involving the project in period 2. Let S be the space of feasible revenue-sharing
rules, de…ned by S ´{s : R+! R+ j s is Lebesgue measurable}: The revenue-
sharing part of the contract gives M 1 an amount of s1(X) 2 S based on the total
public revenue and M 2 the rest of the revenue, i.e., s2(X) = X ¡s1(X): 8 Because we
are concerned with the question of the bundling of revenue sharing and control rights,
we will restrict our attention to linear, budget-balancing revenue-sharing contracts.
The linearity assumption seems rather natural in a double moral hazard setup. In
fact, several authors have shown under fairly general conditions that a linear contract
is optimal in one-period double moral hazard models (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine,
1995; Kim and Wang, 1998; and Romano, 1994). We will also show that a linear
revenue-sharing contract can achieve the second-best outcome if it is possible to write
a complete state-contingent contract (see Proposition 1).
We suppose that the initial contract agreed upon by the two parties is e¢cient ex
ante. This is plausible so long as we assume that both parties have unlimited wealth
and that information is symmetric. In order to reach an agreement on such a contract,
a lump-sum transfer payment between the two parties may be needed. The amount
of such a payment may depend on each party’s bargaining power. Since it has no
incentive e¤ect, we will ignore it throughout the paper.
The ex ante contract may be renegotiated ex post in period 2, after the investments
are sunk and the state of nature is realized but before action a is taken. Since a is
ex post veri…able, the two parties may want to take advantage of the opportunity to
ensure that the ex post action is e¢cient if the initial contract may fail to achieve that.
Even if it is possible to sign a renegotiation-proof ex ante contract, the possibility of
ex post renegotiation may have e¤ects on the design of the initial contract. We assume
asset’s return at no extra cost or to manipulate accounting costs and receive a fraction of the extra
costs as a private bene…t. In demonstrating the possibility for joint ownership to be optimal, Hart
(1995, pp.68-69) provides an example in which there are two parties making investments on a physical
asset and the controlling party can grab all the revenue ex post without incurring any cost. He
points out that when both parties’ investments are important, joint ownership can be optimal. These
examples are special cases of our model.
8We restrict ourselves to budget-balancing contracts for the well-known reason that commiting to
throwing money away is not credible, because it is ex post ine¢cient.
8that the renegotiation game always achieves an ex post e¢cient outcome, i.e., a = a¤.
The distribution of payo¤s among the two parties depends on which bargaining solution
concepts one uses.
There are two broad types of bargaining solutions one can use for the ex post
renegotiation game. One is the cooperative Nash bargaining solution. The other
is derived from noncooperative bargaining games, particularly the Rubinstein-style
alternating-o¤er games. Within the Nash solution, the choice of disagreement points
is also important. One choice of the disagreement point is the no-negotiation outcome
as used in most of the incomplete contract literature; the other is the so-called rational
threats. We will show that di¤erent bargaining solution concepts may lead to di¤erent
results.
Furthermore, we assume that there is a small cost, "; to each party if they engage
in an ex post renegotiation. It is so small that no renegotiation will be deterred by
such a cost. It is nevertheless a cost so that if a non-renegotiation-proof contract
achieves an outcome (apart from the small renegotiation cost) that is also achievable
by a renegotiation-proof contact, the former is strictly dominated by the latter. The
role of such a small renegotiation cost will become clear later in the paper. It is mostly
a technical assumption that ensures the uniqueness of equilibrium.
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The Timing of Events
3. Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we …rst consider, as a benchmark, a state-contingent second-best
revenue-sharing contract. In 3.2, we show that in the case of joint control, the only
renegotiation-proof revenue-sharing contract is the 50:50 sharing rule. In 3.3, we prove
a technical result regarding the optimal revenue-sharing contract among a class of
renegotiation-proof contracts that are not second-best. This result will be used to
prove all the main results of the paper. Finally, in 3.4, we describe an example that
will be used throughout the paper to provide intuition for the analysis and to derive
more speci…c results.
93.1. The Second Best
If a complete, state-contingent contract can be signed at the beginning of period
1, then the allocation of control rights becomes irrelevant. We assume that the initial
contract is always chosen to maximize the total surplus. (Note again that a lump sum
transfer payment may be needed to re‡ect the ex ante bargaining power of the two
parties.) The second-best outcome can be achieved through a contract that speci…es an
optimal revenue-sharing rule and the second-period action contingent on the state of




2 are the second-best investment
levels to be de…ned below, which are assumed to be unique. The problem of maximizing
the total surplus can be written as
V = max
si2S;e1;e22E







































s1(x) + s2(x) = x; for all x 2 R+; (1e)
where (1a) and (1b) are the …rst-order conditions of the individuals’ incentive problems,
and (1c) and (2d) are the corresponding second-order conditions.
Proposition 1. If an ex ante state-contingent contract is possible, then with Assump-














2); which induces the second-best investment e¤orts e¤














In addition, we have 0 < ®¤
i < 1; and the …rst-best outcome cannot be achieved.
10Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995) are the …rst to provide a similar result to
Proposition 1 and its proof for a special output process with the distribution function
of the form F(x;h) = F(x¡h): Kim and Wang (1998) provide a general result without
a proof. We here provide a rigorous proof under weaker conditions for the general result
in Kim and Wang (1998). Romano (1994) also provides an optimal linear contract for
a special double moral hazard model.
Without loss of generality, we assume throughout the paper that ®¤
1 < 1=2; which
can be interpreted as M 2’s investment incentive being relatively more important than
M 1’s.
If a must be decided ex post in period 2, then there is no guarantee that the second-
best outcome can be achieved. Particularly, the second-best ex ante revenue-sharing
contract may not be renegotiation-proof ex post after the investments are sunk.
3.2. Joint Control
In the case of joint control, a is decided ex post jointly by both parties, and
both cooperative (Nash) bargaining solution and a Rubinstein-style alternating o¤er
bargaining game yield the same outcome. For the Nash bargaining solution, the dis-
agreement point is clearly (0;0) for each party. Therefore, the bargaining outcome
is a = a¤ and two parties share equally the total revenue regardless of the initial
revenue sharing agreement. Such a split-the-gains solution can also be derived from
an alternating-bargaining game in which there is a common discount factor and it is
su¢ciently close to one.
The renegotiation-proof revenue-sharing contract is thus the 50:50 sharing rule. If
joint control is chosen in period 1, then, because of the small renegotiation cost, a 50:50
revenue-sharing contract will be signed in period 1.
3.3. A Lemma
In this subsection, we prove a lemma which will be used in all the proofs of the
propositions in the rest of the paper.
Lemma 1. For i 2 f1;2g and any constant k 2 (®¤
i; 1]; among all renegotiation-
proof contracts with a revenue sharing rule ®i ¸ k; the contract in which ®i = k is
the most e¢cient.
The lemma is intuitive. It simply says that the further the (renegotiation-proof)
revenue-sharing rule deviates from the second-best one, the less e¢cient it becomes.
113.4. An Example
Throughout the paper, we will use an example with speci…c functional forms both
to provide intuition for the analysis and to derive more speci…c results.
Let the composite investment be
h(e1;e2) = ¹1e1 + ¹2e2;
where ¹1 and ¹2 are two arbitrary positive constants. h(e1;e2) satis…es Assumption
1. In this example, let the investment space be E = R+: Let the output process be
X
¤(!;h) = ~ Ah;
where ~ A ´ A(!) is a random variable, A(!) > 0 and E( ~ A) = 1: Thus, we have
R(e1;e2) = ¹1e1 + ¹2e2;
which satis…es Assumption 3. In other words, the expected total revenue is equal to a
weighted average of investments.
We assume a linear functional form for the composite investment (e¤ort) and the
(expected) revenue function for easy calculation. There is one caveat; i.e., the pre-
condition for the above setup is that the two parties both participate in the project in
period 1. Thus when e1 = 0; it does not mean that M 1 does not participate.






i; for i = 1;2;
which satis…es Assumption 2. Then, we can easily compute the second-best invest-












































Since we have assumed ®¤
2 > 1=2 > ®¤
1; we also assume ¹2 > ¹1; which means that
M 2 is more productive than M 1 or her investment is more important.
124. Optimal Contracts I: Nash Bargaining
We employ subgame perfect equilibrium as the equilibrium concept in analyzing
the two-period game. Using the backward induction principle, we …rst analyze the ex
post renegotiation game and then derive the ex ante optimal contract.
In period 2 when e1 and e2 are sunk and a contract on revenue sharing and control
rights allocation is in place, the two parties can renegotiate on the share of revenue and
bargain over a: Suppose that one of the parties, say M i;is allocated with the control
rights in the ex ante contract and that her contractual share of public revenue is ®i i.e.,
®1X for M 1 and (1¡®1)X for M 2. If renegotiation in period 2 is not allowed, then
M i chooses a to maximize her own private payo¤. In this section, we consider Nash
bargaining for the renegotiation game and, because of transferable utilities, assume
that the two parties split the gains from the renegotiation (see Myerson, 1991, p. 385).
But there is a need to identify the disagreement point, i.e., the status quo. In Section
5, we use a noncooperative bargaining game to derive the bargaining solution. We will
see that when the control rights over a are given to a single party, bargaining solution
concepts matter.
4.1. No-Negotiation Outcome as the Disagreement Point
It is quite common in the literature to identify the no-renegotiation outcome as the
disagreement point in Nash bargaining (see, e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986). In this
case, renegotiation will take place only if either a single party is assigned the control
rights over a, and she would choose a 6= a¤ in the absence of renegotiation, or if joint
control is stipulated in the initial contract and hence two parties must jointly decide
on a: For brevity, we will also speak of the choice of (or control rights over) q instead
of the action a.
In the case of single party control, the disagreement point is determined by the
initial sharing contract as well as the q that the controlling party would choose unilat-
erally in the absence of renegotiation. Given ex ante investments e1 and e2 and given
a revenue sharing rule ®i; the controlling party can either choose q = 1 to obtain the
maximum public surplus X¤(!;h) and get ®iX¤(!;h); or choose a q to maximize
her own private surplus:
max
0·q·1 ®iqX
¤(!;h) + bi(1 ¡ q)X
¤(!;h) ´ [bi + (®i ¡ bi)q]X
¤(!;h):
If renegotiation is not allowed, M i would choose q = 1 if ®i ¸ bi or q = 0 if ®i < bi: 9
9Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that the controlling party chooses q = 1 instead of
13The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium (and optimal) ex ante con-
tract for the case where the disagreement point for the Nash bargaining solution is
determined by the payo¤ structure in the absence of renegotiation.





2 be the second-best sharing rule. Under
Nash bargaining with the no-negotiation outcome as the disagreement point:
(1) If ®¤
i ¸ bi for either i = 1 or 2 but not both, then an ex ante contract that
speci…es ®i = ®¤
i and gives M i the control rights over a is the unique optimal
contract and implements the second-best outcome.
(2) If ®¤
i ¸ bi for both i = 1 and 2; then an ex ante contract that speci…es ®i = ®¤
i
and gives any one of the parties the control rights implements the second-best
outcome.
(3) If ®¤
i < bi forboth i = 1 and 2; then the second-best outcome cannot be achieved.
Depending on the parameters, either single party control or joint control can be
optimal. In the case of control by M i; the optimal share of revenue for M i is
®i = bi: Furthermore, if b1 < 1=2; then M 1 control is more e¢cient than joint
control; and if b1 > 1=2; joint control is more e¢cient than M 1 control.
In either case, ex ante optimal contracts are renegotiation-proof.
q = 0 when she is indi¤erent between the two choices (for example, when ®i = bi in this case); and
we do not explicitly distinguish among outcomes that di¤er only when ®i = bi (in Subsection 4.1),



















i i a a =
M2 control, SB,
*



























2 2 b = a
Joint control,
or
Figure 2. Illustration of Proposition 2
Part (1) of Proposition 2, which is illustrated in Figure 2, where SB stands for
“second best”, says that control rights should be given to the party for whom the
private bene…t acquired for each dollar of the total revenue lost as a result of a sub-
optimal action is no greater than her second-best contractual share of the revenue.
The condition ®¤
i ¸ bi ensures that the second-best ex ante revenue-sharing agreement
®i = ®¤
i will not be renegotiated because the controlling party M i would voluntarily
choose the ex post e¢cient action if renegotiation is not allowed. Part (2) simply says
that if this condition holds for both parties such as in the case where bi = 0 for i = 1
and 2; then any party can have the control rights and the second-best revenue sharing
rule ®i = ®¤
i is self-enforcing.
Part (3) of the proposition says that if the above condition fails to hold for either
of the two parties (i.e., it is relatively easy for any of the two parties to acquire pri-
vate bene…ts from having the control rights), then the second-best revenue-sharing rule
cannot be implemented in the second period. This is because, in the absence of rene-
gotiation, the controlling party would have incentives to choose an ine¢cient action
since the private bene…t acquired from such an action more than o¤sets her loss in
contractual income as stipulated by a second-best sharing rule. A special case is when
bi = 1 for i = 1 and 2 (i.e., the controlling party can grab all the revenue at no cost).
In this case, M 1 control is never optimal. It is e¢cient either for M 2 to have the
control rights if her investment incentive is very important or for the control right to
15be held jointly if, for example, ®¤
i is close to 1=2 (i.e., when both parties’ investment
incentives are almost equally important).10
Shares of income and control rights are bundled when either M 2 has the control
rights and shares the majority of revenue or when control rights are jointly held and
revenue is shared equally between the two parties. On the other hand, unbundling of
income and control occurs when M 1 has the control rights and shares a minority of
the revenue. Given that ®¤
2 > 1=2 > ®¤
1; bundling of income and control is more likely
to occur than unbundling of the two. This can be seen more clearly from Figure 2,
in which the area for M1 control (i.e., unbundling) to be uniquely optimal is much
smaller than the area in which bundling of income and control is uniquely optimal.
We will see later that unbundling can be optimal only under Nash bargaining with the
no-negotiation outcome as the disagreement point.
In case (3) of Proposition 2, we cannot determine precisely when a certain way of
allocating control rights is optimal. In the following, we use the same example from
3.4 to derive more speci…c results for this case.
Given that b1 > ®¤
1; under M 1 control, by Lemma 1, the optimal sharing rule is


































Given that b2 > ®¤
2; then under M 2 control, the optimal sharing rule is ®2 = b2:






















10Hart (1995, p.79) observes that the hold-up problem remains even when revenue-sharing is possible
by noting that in the case that is equivalent to joint control in our model, either party can trigger the
no-revenue outcome with the intention to renegotiate the initial revenue-sharing contract. With his
implicit assumption that bi = 0; our result shows that the initial contract will not be renegotiated
so long as control rights are allocated to a single party regardless of which party it is. This result,
however, depends on the particular bargaining concept we have used. Control rights should be given
to M 2 in this case if rational threats are used as the disagreement point (see Subsection 4.2 below).
16Under joint control, the renegotiation-proof sharing rule is ®i = 1
2: Again, we can
similarly …nd e1 =
¹1
2 ; e2 =
¹2












In the region de…ned by b2 > ®¤
2 ¸ 1
2 and b1 < 1
2; we compare joint control with
































< b2 ¡ ®
¤
2:
That is, if b2 > 2®¤
2 ¡ 1
2; we have VJ > V2; otherwise VJ · V2:
In the region de…ned by ®¤
1 < b1 < 1
2 and ®¤
2 < b2; we compare M 1 control with





























































V1 > V2 , b1 ¡ ®
¤
1 < b2 ¡ ®
¤
2:
Thus, if and only if b2 > b1+®¤
2¡®¤
1; M 1 control is better than M2 control. The linear
line b2 = b1 + ®¤
2 ¡ ®¤











Therefore, the e¢cient control rights allocation for all combinations (b1;b2) in the
region [0; 1] £ [0; 1] is well de…ned. The optimal revenue-sharing and control rights
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Figure 3. Optimal Contract in the Example for Proposition 2
The indeterminacy of the optimal allocation of control rights in case (3) of Propo-
sition 2 appears to be a weakness with the use of the no-negotiation outcome as the
disagreement point. Consider a rather extreme example in which b1 = b2 = 0; and
®¤
2 = 0:99 and ®¤
1 = 0:01 (for example, when M 1’s investment is almost negligible).
It does not seem to be natural for M 1 to be given the control rights in this example.
Having almost nothing to lose, M 1 might ex post demand a larger share of the revenue
by threatening to choose a very ine¢cient action. Given the fact that M 1 does not
have much to lose while M 2 would lose everything if the threat is carried out, M 2
may indeed yield to M 1’s demand: This discussion motivates us to consider using a
di¤erent disagreement point in the Nash bargaining solution.
4.2. Rational Threats as the Disagreement Point
In the Nash bargaining solution, the payo¤ from renegotiation for one party in-
creases as the disagreement payo¤ for the other party decreases. Hence, given the
prospect of reaching a cooperative agreement, each party may try to create a more fa-
vorable disagreement point by acting more antagonistically in the bargaining process.
For instance, the controlling party, in the renegotiation process, can threaten to take
q = 0 if doing so can hurt the other party more than it hurts herself. By making such
a threat, the controlling party may be able to extract a larger share of the revenue even
if in the end she will not carry out the threat. This is the notion of rational threats
18(see Nash, 1953, and Myerson, 1991). Rational threats as the disagreement point di¤er
from the no-negotiation outcome used above. In the latter case, when the controlling
party has incentives to voluntarily choose q = 1 in the absence of renegotiation, then
no renegotiation will take place. When rational threats are used to determine the dis-
agreement point, the controlling party may threaten to take q < 1 as long as it hurts
the other party more than it hurts herself if the threat is actually carried out. This
may be so even if the controlling party would choose q = 1 if renegotiation were not
allowed.
From the noncooperative game-theoretical point of view, the use of rational threats
as the status quo in a bargaining game requires that the player who makes a threat
be able to commit to carry out the threat if her o¤er (or demand) is rejected (Nash,
1953). If such a commitment cannot be made credible, then the use of “rational”
threats becomes questionable. However, rational threats as the status quo is no more
questionable than the no-negotiation outcome, because when taken as the status quo
in a bargaining game, no-negotiation as a threat itself needs to be credible as well.
Rational threats are derived as follows. Suppose M i has the control rights. Given
a threat qi and an initial contract (®1;®2); then the disagreement payo¤ for M i is
[bi+(®i¡bi)qi]X¤(!;h): The party, M j; who has no control rights has no instrument
for threats and her disagreement payo¤ is qi(1¡®i)X¤(!;h): Therefore, the payo¤ that
the controlling party M i receives fromthe renegotiation game with such a disagreement
point is




















M i chooses a threat qi to maximize this payo¤. Thus, if ®i ¸
1+bi
2 ; then the threat
is qi = 1 and M i’s payo¤ from a renegotiation is ®iX¤(!;h): In other words, if the
controlling party M i is given by the initial contract a share of revenue ®i ¸
1+bi
2 ;
then she will choose q = 1 voluntarily without further renegotiation. Otherwise, she
will initiate a renegotiation and choose a threat qi = 0 and correspondingly receive
a payo¤
1+bi
2 X¤(!;h) from the renegotiation. Now we are ready to establish the
following proposition.





2 be the second-best sharing rule. Under




2 ; then an ex ante contract that speci…es ®2 = ®¤
2 and gives M 2





2 ; then the second-best outcome cannot be achieved. Depending on
the parameters, either M 2 control or joint control can be optimal. M 1 control is
never optimal unless b1 = 0, in which case, ®1 = 1=2: Furthermore, if M 2 has
the control rights, then ®2 =
1+b2
2 :
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Figure 4. Illustration of Proposition 3
Proposition 3, which is illustrated in Figure 4, shows that under Nash bargaining
with rational threats as the disagreement point, revenue sharing and control rights are
always bundled together; in other words, either the majority shareholder, who is also
the party whose investment incentive is more important, should have the control rights
or the control rights should be held jointly by the two parties, each of whom has 50%
of the income shares of the joint venture. M 2 control would make the second-best ex
ante revenue-sharing agreement renegotiation-proof ex post (i.e., self-enforcing) when
her ability to acquire private bene…ts is not too strong relative to her second-best
contractual share of the revenue. For instance, when b1 = b2 = 0; M 2 should have
the control rights while M 1 should not. In other words, in the absence of private
20bene…ts of control, the party whose investment incentive is more important should
have the control rights. This is in contrast with the result in Proposition 2 when the
no-negotiation outcome is taken as the disagreement point. The intuition is that, under
Nash bargaining with rational threats as the disagreement point, when M 1 has control
and has a share of revenue less than 1/2, she would demand ex post a larger share
(say, 1/2) by threatening to choose the most ine¢cient action. In another special case
where b1 = b2 = 1 (i.e., the controlling party can grab all the revenue at no cost), the
optimal contract is the same as in the case when the no-negotiation outcome is used
as the disagreement point.
We now use the same example to derive more speci…c results for Part (2) of Proposi-
tion 3. Let us de…ne d1 ´
1+b1
2 and d2 ´
1+b2
2 : When we replace bi by di; Proposition
3 becomes Proposition 2 with the exception that ®¤
1 cannot be greater than d1 by
assumption. Thus, the results for the parametric example of Proposition 2 can be car-
ried over to Proposition 3 directly. Formally, we have: if d2 > 2®¤
2 ¡
1
2; then VJ > V2;
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Figure 5. Optimal Contract in the Example for Proposition 3
A conclusion we can drawfromthis section regardingtheNash bargainingsolution is
that the use of di¤erent disagreement points can lead to di¤erent results. For instance,
when rational threats are used, M 1 control is never optimal while it can be optimal if
the no-negotiation outcome is taken to be the disagr em nt oi t. he as ba gai in
21solution itself does not provide any guidance on what kind of disagreement point one
should use. This appears to be a weakness of the Nash bargaining solution.
From the noncooperative perspective, as is remarked above, for the no-negotiation
outcome or rational threats to a¤ect the bargaining outcome, the threats must be
credible. We now turn to the analysis of optimal contracting using a noncooperative
bargaining game for ex post renegotiation.
5. Optimal Contracts II: Alternating-O¤er Bargain-
ing
In this section, we use Rubinstein’s alternating-o¤er bargaining game to model the
ex post contract renegotiation.
Suppose M i has the control rights over a: In the second period, M i can choose
not to start a renegotiation with M j; where j 6= i; but to choose a unilaterally and
then divide the public revenue with M j according to the ex ante revenue-sharing rule.
If M i decides to initiate a renegotiation, then we suppose it is over a new contract
that speci…es the optimal action a¤ (i.e., q = 1) and a sharing rule ®i (and hence
®j = 1 ¡ ®i): The bargaining is thus equivalent to a division of a …xed-sized pie
given the sunk investments and the assumption of risk neutrality. The rule of the
renegotiation game is assumed as follows. M i begins by proposing to M j a new
contract. M j then accepts or refuses this proposal. If M j accepts the o¤er, the
bargaining game ends with an agreement as proposed by M i: If she rejects the o¤er,
then in the second round, M j makes a counter-o¤er and M i responds by either (1)
accepting, (2) rejecting and going to the next round or (3) rejecting and unilaterally
terminating the bargaining and opting out to exercise the control rights. In case (3),
M i receives O ´ Maxfqg[bi+(®i¡bi)q]X¤(!;h) while M j receives (1¡®i)qX¤(!;h).
The above procedure continues with the two parties alternating in being the proposer
until either an agreement is reached or M i opts out. There is a common discount factor
± < 1: We further assume that the party who has no control rights cannot terminate
the bargaining process.
The above structure of the bargaining game is similar to the structure of the
alternating-o¤er noncooperative bargaining game with one party having the outside
option (Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1989; Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990, pp.55-58).
The di¤erence between our bargaining game and that of Binmore et al. is that in their
game when the party having an outside option exercises that option, the other party
gets 0 payo¤ while in our game, if the controlling party chooses to exercise the control
22rights (i.e., unilaterally determines q), the other party receives her share of the public
revenue according to the initial contract (i.e., (1 ¡ ®i)qX¤(!;h)). However, it can be
shown that with an in…nite horizon and a discount factor approaching to 1; the “out-
side options principle” proposed by Binmore et al. equally applies to our bargaining
game as de…ned above. (The proof is similar to that in Binmore et al. and is thus
omitted.) Speci…cally, we have the following bargaining solution:
Noncooperative Bargaining Solution: Given an initial contract that assigns
M i the control rights and a share of revenue ®i, then from the renegotiation: (1) M i
receives O ´ Maxfqg[bi + (®i ¡ bi)q]X¤(!;h) if O ¸
1
2X¤(!;h); (2) M i receives
1
2X¤(!;h) if O < 1
2X¤(!;h):
Obviously, O = ®iX¤(!;h) if ®i ¸ bi; and O = biX¤(!;h) if ®i < bi: This is
because if M i terminates the renegotiation, she will choose q = 1 when ®i ¸ bi or
q = 0 when ®i < bi: The following lemma is self-evident.





; then M i ’s payo¤





; then M i’s payo¤
from renegotiation is maxf
1
2;bigX¤(!;h):
We are now ready to prove the following proposition.





2 be the second-best sharing rule. Under
alternating-o¤er bargaining as de…ned above:
(1) If ®¤
2 ¸ b2; then an ex ante contract that speci…es ®2 = ®¤
2 and gives M 2 control
rights over a is the unique optimal contract and implements the second-best
outcome.
(2) If ®¤
2 < b2; then the second-best outcome cannot be achieved. Depending on the
parameters, either single party control or joint control can be optimal. In the






Furthermore, if b1 > 1=2; then M 1 control is not optimal; if b1 · 1=2; then M 1
control yields the same outcome as joint control.
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Figure 6. Illustartion of Proposition 4
Similar to the result derived under Nash bargaining with rational threats, Proposi-
tion 4, which is illustrated in Figure 6, shows that, under alternating-o¤er bargaining,
income and control rights are also always bundled together. This is because, under
noncooperative bargaining, the minority shareholder can threaten to choose an ine¢-
cient action, and by doing so can secure in the renegotiation a share of revenue no less
than 50%. The di¤erence between the rational threats solution and the noncooperative
bargaining solution is that the minority party (say M 1) receives in the renegotiation a
share of (1 + b1)=2 in the former case but a share of 1=2 in the latter case. In either
case, minority control cannot achieve the second best and, given the small renegoti-
ation cost, is dominated by an ex ante contract that bundles the control rights with
equity shares by assigning M 1 the control rights with a share of revenue (1 + b1)=2
and 1=2 (or more practically, 51% voting shares) respectively.
Di¤ering from Proposition 3, M 1 control (with a share of revenue at 50%) may
be optimal under noncooperative bargaining if her ability to acquire private bene…ts
from control is weak while M 2’s ability to do so is not. In practice, the ownership
arrangement of M 1 control with ®1 = 1=2 can be interpreted as a 51:49 equity joint
venture with M 1 having 51% of voting shares. Such an ownership arrangement is
equivalent to joint control in terms of e¢ciency. But if joint control entails, say, a
decision cost, the 51:49 equity joint venture would be uniquely optimal. This may
explain the prevalence of the existence of such an ownership arrangement among joint
ventures.
24Again, we use the example to get a speci…c result for part (2) of Proposition 4.
De…ne t1 ´ maxf
1
2;b1g and t2 ´ maxf
1
2;b2g: When we replace bi by ti; Proposition
4 becomes Proposition 2 with the exception that ®¤
1 cannot be greater than t1 by
assumption. Thus, the results for the parametric example of Proposition 2 can be
carried over to Proposition 4 directly. Formally, if t2 > 2®¤
2 ¡
1
2; we have VJ > V2;
otherwise VJ < V2: Since ®¤
2 ¸
1
2; for b2 ¸ ®¤
2; we have t2 = b2: Thus, for the region
with b2 ¸ ®¤
2 in Figure 7, if b2 > 2®¤
2¡ 1
2; we have VJ > V2; otherwise VJ < V2: Figure
7, which is divided into four control zones, shows the optimal allocation of revenue and















2 2 - a
M2 control, SB,
*
2 2 a a =
M2 control, 2 2 b = a
Joint control
2
1 = i a
M1 or Joint control
M1 control = Joint control
2
1 = i a
Figure 7. Control Zones in the Example for Proposition 4
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we adopt the incomplete contracts approach of Grossman-Hart-Moore
to study how income rights and control rights are optimally linked to each other in
the context of joint ventures. For ease of comparison, we summarize in the following
table the main results of the paper as derived from the example. Each cell of the
table indicates the condition(s) for one of the three ways of allocating control rights
to be optimal under one of the three bargaining scenarios as well as the corresponding
optimal revenue sharing (in brackets).
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[®1 = ®2 = 1=2].
Several conclusions can be drawn from our analysis. First, GHM’s main insight
that control rights matter in the organization of economic transactions holds regardless
of whether or not income is contractible and regardless of which bargaining solution
concept is used. Particularly, control rights should, more often than not, be allocated
to the party whose investment incentive is relatively more important (i.e., M 2); noting
from the table that the condition for M 2 control is easier to be satis…ed.
Second, income and control are usually bundled together; and it is always so under
both Nash bargaining with rational threats as the disagreement point and noncoopera-
tive alternating-o¤er bargaining. Unbundling can be optimal only when Nash bargain-
ing solution with the no-negotiation outcome is used (the upper left cell of the table
corresponds to this case). Particularly, when the opportunity for acquiring private
bene…ts is limited, a proper allocation of control rights (usually to the investment-wise
more important party) makes the second-best revenue-sharing contract self-enforcing
and hence provides optimal investment incentives.
Third, joint control may be optimal when there is ample opportunity for the con-
trolling party to acquire private bene…ts and incentives to invest by both parties are
important (i.e., ®¤
2 is relatively close to 1/2).
Finally, our results can be used to explain di¤erent types of ownership structure
of equity joint ventures. Speci…cally, equity shares in a joint venture are often char-
acterized by both the rights to share revenue and the rights of control. The majority
shareholding partner of a joint venture is normally the controlling party. A 50:50
ownership structure is usually associated with joint control. A 51:49 joint venture can
practically be interpreted as a contractual arrangement in which the two partners share
26the revenue equally but only one partner has the control rights. The upper right cell
of the table corresponds to this case.
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29Appendix A
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
We will …rst ignore the inequality constraints (1c) and (1d); we will later prove that














So, the problem is equivalent to
max
s22S;e1;e22E

















2) be the solution to the above problem without the second constraint, i.e.,
the solution to the following problem:
max
e1;e22E










Problem (A2) is not related to a contract. Given (e¤
1;e¤
2); we look for a contract s2(x)
that satis…es the second condition of problem (A1). There are many such contracts. In
particular, a sharing contract of the form s2(x) = ®2x will do. The second constraint
























This means that (e¤
1;e¤
2;®¤
2) is a solution of problem (A1); it is thus the solution of
problem (1) without constraints (1c) and (1d). Will the second-order conditions (1c)
and (1d) be satis…ed by the solution? For s¤
2(x) = ®¤




























2) is a solution of problem (1).













By Assumptions 1 and 2, we thus have 0 < ®¤



















by the constraint of (A2), the solution (e¤
1;e¤
2) of problem (A2) cannot be the …rst
best. Proposition 1 is thus proven.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, consider a contract that allocates M 2 with a share of
revenue ®2 ¸ k > ®¤
2: We need to show that for all renegotiation-proof contracts
with ®2 ¸ k > ®¤
2; the sharing rule ®2 = k maximizes the total expected surplus.
Because the contract is renegotiation-proof, the sharing rule will be implemented (i.e.,
self-enforcing) in the second period and q = 1 will be chosen, following the proof of
Proposition 1, by problem (A1), we only need to show ®2 = k is the solution to the
following maximization problem :
max
®2¸k;e1;e22E













Now consider the following problem:
max
®2¸k;e1;e22E













If the solution to this problem (^ ®2; ^ e1; ^ e2) satis…es ^ ®2R0
2(^ e1; ^ e2) < c0
2(^ e2); then it would
also be the solution to the problem without the condition ®2R0
2(e1;e2) · c0
2(e2): Then,
by (A2), (^ e1;^ e2) would be the second-best (e¤
1;e¤











2: But this contradicts the assumption that ®¤
2 < k: Thus, the inequality
condition in (A4) must be binding, which means that problems (A3) and (A4) are
equivalent. The Lagrangian function for (A4) is





















where ¸ · 0: Suppose ¸ = 0: Then the above Lagrangian function is equivalent to the
one for the maximization problem (A2), implying that the solution to (A4), (^ e1; ^ e2; ^ ®2);
is the same as that to (A2) and hence is the second-best solution, i.e., (^ e1; ^ e2) = (e¤
1;e¤
2):
But this leads to a contradiction as we have shown above. Thus, ¸ < 0: Therefore,
the optimal ®2 for (A4) must be as small as possible, i.e., ^ ®2 = k:
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a contract that gives M i the control rights and speci…es a revenue sharing
rule ®i: If ®i ¸ bi; her choice is q = 1: This is an ex post e¢cient outcome, and hence
there is no mutually bene…cial renegotiation. If ®i < bi; then M i would choose q = 0
if there is no renegotiation. This is ine¢cient, and hence the two parties will resort to
renegotiation in order to reach an ex post e¢cient agreement. (Recall that the …xed
renegotiation cost " is so small that ex post renegotiation cannot be deterred. That is,
gains from renegotiation for each party are greater than ":) The payo¤ after e¢cient












In other words, when the initial contract gives the controlling party M i a share of
revenue less than bi; her e¤ective share after renegotiation is
1+bi
2 ; which is larger
than bi:
(1) Since ®¤
i ¸ bi; a revenue-sharing rule ®i = ®¤
i ¸ bi is renegotiation-proof and
implements the second-best outcome. Clearly, all otherrevenue-sharing rules with ®i ¸
bi are sub-optimal. The sharing rules with ®i < bi · ®¤
i would entail renegotiation.
The e¤ective sharing rule after renegotiation would at best induce the second-best
investments (this occurs only when
1+bi
2 = ®¤
i ). Given the small renegotiation cost, a
sharing rule that is not renegotiation-proof is sub-optimal.
(2) This part is immediately implied by part (1).
(3) Suppose the initial contract allocates M i with the control rights. Given that
®¤
i < bi; all the sharing rules with ®i ¸ bi are, by Lemma 1, Pareto-dominated by
the sharing rule ®i = bi: On the other hand, any sharing rule with ®i < bi leads to
renegotiation and the post-renegotiation share for M i is
1+b1
2 ; which is greater than
b1: Thus, after the small renegotiation cost " is taken into account, a sharing rule of
32®i =
1+bi
2 ; which is renegotiation-proof, dominates all the sharing rules with ®i < bi.
But a contract with ®i =
1+bi
2 > bi is, by Lemma 1, dominated by the contract with
®i = bi: Therefore, if M i is given the control rights, then the optimal sharing rule
is ®i = bi; which is renegotiation-proof. Notice that since bi > ®¤
i; the second-best
outcome cannot be implemented.
Furthermore, suppose ®¤
1 < b1 < 1=2: A joint control contract with or without a
revenue sharing rule is equivalent to the renegotiation-proof contract that stipulates
joint control and an equal share of revenue between two parties (i.e., ®1 = 1=2), which,
by Lemma 1, is Pareto-dominated by a renegotiation-proof contract that allocates M 1
with the control rights and a share of revenue ®1 = b1: In other words, M 1 control
dominates joint control.
Nowsuppose b1 > 1=2: Any contract that allocates M 1 with the control rightsmust
optimally have the renegotiation-proof sharing rule ®1 = b1: Because b1 > 1=2 > ®¤
1;
by Lemma 1, such a contract is Pareto-dominated by a joint control contract with
®1 = 1=2: Therefore, Proposition 2 is proven.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3




M 2 will choose q = 1 voluntarily without further renegotiation and hence the second-
best outcome is implemented. Any sharing rule with ®2 ¸
1+b2
2 but ®2 6= ®¤
2 is
clearly sub-optimal. A sharing rule with ®2 <
1+b2
2 would entail renegotiation and the
post-renegotiation share of revenue is
1+b2
2 : Because of the small renegotiation cost,
such a sharing rule is thus dominated by the sharing rule ®2 =
1+b2
2 ; which is optimal
if and only if ®¤
2 =
1+b2
2 : Next, we consider the case of M 1 control with a sharing
rule ®1: Suppose ®1 <
1+b1
2 . The expected payo¤ from the renegotiation with the
rational threat q = 0 is
1+b1
2 X¤(!;h): This outcome, again, can be implemented by
a revenue-sharing contract ®1 =
1+b1
2 without incurring the renegotiation cost. Now
suppose ®1 ¸
1+b1
2 ; which is greater than ®¤
1. By Lemma 1, the optimal share must
be ®1 =
1+b1
2 : Thus, M 1 control cannot implement the second-best outcome and is
sub-optimal.
(2) Similar to the case of M 1 control, we can prove that in the case of M 2 control,





2 . It is also renegotiation-proof
and cannot achieve the second-best outcome. As is shown in (1), in the case of M 1
33control, the optimal sharing rule is ®1 =
1+b1
2 ; which is greater than 1=2 unless b1 = 0:





1; this contract is dominated by a joint control
contract with ®1 = 1=2; which is renegotiation-proof, unless b1 = 0: Thus M 1 control
cannot be optimal unless b1 = 0; in which case, it is equivalent to the joint control.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4
(1) The contract that speci…es ®2 = ®¤
2 and gives M 2 the control rights over
a is renegotiation-proof and clearly implements the second-best outcome. This is






; and by Lemma 2, M 2’s payo¤ from renegotiation is
®2X¤(!;h). In the case of M 2 control, any renegotiation-proof sharing rule with ®2 6=
®¤






) entails a small renegotiation cost and hence cannot be optimal.






; which is greater than ®¤
1; and hence cannot be optimal.
(2) The condition ®¤
2 < b2 implies b2 > 1
















for both i = 1 and 2: Now





; then by Lemma 2, M i’s
renegotiation payo¤ is ®iX(!;h): Thus the initial contract is renegotiation-proof. By

















; then the contract will






outcome, however, can be implemented by a renegotiation-proof sharing rule ®i =
maxf
1
2;big: We have thus proven that in the case of M i control, the optimal sharing







; the second-best outcome cannot
be achieved. Furthermore, if b1 > 1=2; then in the case of M 1 control, the optimal





= b1. By Lemma 1, this contract is dominated by a
joint control contract with ®1 = 1=2: Thus M 1 is not optimal in this case. If b1 · 1=2;
and M 1 has control, then the optimal sharing of revenue is ®1 = 1=2: This contract
hence yields the same outcome as joint control.
End
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